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ABSTRACT
This article examines and presents thoughts on previ-
ous and recent analyses of pension system in Croatia, 
after which authors identify main conclusions and 
present strongholds towards future optimization of 
pension system in Croatia. Main points considering 
optimization come from analyzed and projected ef-
fects of different case scenarios, in particular changes 
and/or reforms in Croatian pension system. All the 
significant intellectual contributions on pension sys-
tem are analyzed from the period of pension reforms 
in Croatia from 2002 until 2011, along with some re-
cent but significant analyses. This study also identifies 
fundamental problems in Croatian pension system 
and presents a new perspective considering the direc-
tion of potential future changes with having the in-
crease in level of sustainability and monetary pension 






- reforms of pension system
- demographic changes
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Luburić G, Šipić N.  2013. Long-term optimisation 
fundaments of pension system in Croatia, Ekonomska istraživanja – Economic Research Special Issue 2013
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I. INTRODUCTION
Croatia, as well as other developed countries, awaits unfavorable demographics movements. It 
is hard to be optimistic in view of future parameters in pension system, other social-functioning 
systems, economic growth and prosperity. Goals of social politics, in relation to pension system, 
should be a crucial factor in maintaining social stability, based on long-term sustainability, not 
short-term solutions such as current plenteous pension payments and use of state budget funds 
in lack of better measures. Considering demographic changes and changes in macroeconomic 
variables such as structured unemployment due to uncoordinated labour market supply and de-
mand, that is, shut-down of old and expansion of new business markets, still questionable eco-
nomic development strategy of Croatia, cyclical changes of economic recession and recovery, 
pension system, as one of the pillars of social stability, is at a disadvantegous position irrespective 
of pension reforms that occured ten years ago. The above-mentioned is enough to research the 
future characteristics of Croatia’s pension system in 21st century, especially the issue of sustain-
ability (optimal point) in the next few decades. 
Consequently, authors are considering issues related to one of the pillars of social well-
being: Croatia’s pension insurance system. Criticism of pension system’s sustainability is emerging 
after pension reforms of 1999. and 2002. and in the last ten years. 
Authors are planning to research possible effects of restructuring the existing pension pi-
lars (I. i II. pension pillar). However, few complex qualitative questions arise from getting into set-
tings of mentioned pension pillars: should the pension system strive to achieve greater individu-
alisation as a new paradigm in planning financial security at old age or should it primarily stay in 
state’s domain, for it is the creator of social stability? Should the pension system be optimized as a 
burden for other systems in the sphere of public finances (mainly thinking abouot tax and non-tax 
income deductions)? 
II. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM CROATIA’S PENSION SYSTEM IN FUTURE? 
Very likely structural changes. However, to explain the base for changes in pension system, one 
needs to analyse the issue. Thereat the authors emphasize former contributions (until this paper 
was written) in analysing the state of pension system mainly relying on the results of „Analysis of 
pension system“ project (Institute for public finances and Bank magazine), „Challenges and pos-
sabilites for achieving proper age pensions in Criatia (a study by the Economy institute), and also 
individual contributions of certain authors.
Sustainability of pension system
Many factors affect movement in pension system’s parameters that mainly belong in demographic 
and economic factor groups, from the fertility rate and expected life expectancy, movement of 
young work-active population and older population up in to the employment level, PAYG pen-
sions’ level of budget payments, all under one indicator in pension system: proportion of active 
insured people and retirees (i.e. rate or coefficient of dependence).
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Relation (rate fo de-
pendence)
1980. 1 816 449 4,04
1985. 1 931 524 3,68
1990. 1 968 656 3,00
1995. 1 568 865 1,81
2000. 1 381 1 019 1,36
2004. 1 460 1 066 1,37
2005. 1 507 1 078 1,40
2006. 1 538 1 100 1,40
2007. 1 579 1 121 1,41
2008. 1 605 1 148 1,40
2009. 1 530 1 174 1,31
2010. 1 512 1 211 1,25
2011. 1 485 1 212 1,23
2012. 1 433 1 217 1,18
Source: combined statistical data from HZMO (available at www.mirovinsko.hr)
As seen in table 1, it can be intuitively concluded that financial sustainability of PAYG sys-
tem is esentially unsustainable for more than a decade, if direct payments from state’s budget are 
excluded. In 2011 they amounted for about 85% of total collected pension contributions (2011. 
yearly HZMO financial report, available at www.mirovinsko.hr).  Plainly speaking, for every 100 
kunas of collected contributions from active insurees (those that work), 85 kn is extracted to cover 
current expenditures for pensions. Additional reason for worrying lies in a fact that this financial 
situation, in a pension system, occurs even after conducted pension reforms of 1999 and 2002 (ac-
cepting the time cost of the reform - implicit debt). It should be noted that authors in this research 
do not emphasize the analysis of conducted pension refors so far, but synthesize potential paths 
in restructuring Croatia’s pension system based on existing analyses of other authors linked with 
current (almost a decade after conducted reforms) and future projected states of pension system 
in the next few decades.  
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FIGURE 1 - PROPORTION OF CROATIAN PENSION EXPENDITURES IN CROATIAN GDP (IN %)
Source: combined statistical data from HZMO (available at www.mirovinsko.hr)
The question about pension system’s sustainability, at least so far, did not come into con-
sideration. To be more accurate, no matter of the financial image of pension system (mainly PAYG 
system, under HZMO), budget funds are those that were „putting out fires“ every time. Summa 
summarum, the existance of pensions and socially aware country, in this context, is to protect the 
egistential level of people of old age. Having that in mind, one should not forget that the main 
function of pension system is to serve individuals and their families as a mechanism that will en-
able the allocation of expenditures throughout their lives, especially after a period of employment, 
in case of disability or loss of breadwinner, that is, when insurees are not able to earn for their living 
(Puljiz, 2007). It can be concluded that for society as a whole, and especially for the state, social 
peace in society is equally as important as pension system. 
Authors emphasize the term pension system sustainability as well as optimisation (or level 
of optimisation) of Croatia’s pension system. How is optimisation of pension system monitored? 
What parameters are used? Authors are considering the optimisation of pension system by ob-
serving two perspectives: financial sustainability of pension system and its product- pensions, that 
is, the level of pensions. 
How to observe financial viability of pension system? It is already known that pension sys-
tem is financially not viable for a long period of time. However, Croatia is not an exception.  Many 
european countries have been reforming their pension systems in the last two decades, with dif-
ferent outcome. ‘’Forces of resistance and inertion acted against the reforms, which caused late 
reaction on observed issues, as opposed to objective circumstances that determined necessary 
adjustments. Therefore short-term reforms were usually chosen. They mantain basic structure, 
and gradually change certain elements of pension system with so-called parametrical reforms“ 
(Nestić et al., 2011.:10). State intervention in terms of budgetary payments for pensions, aside from 
collected contributions, is a common occurence in countries with adverse demographic structure. 
Moreover, Croatia is no exception when it comes to this. High portion of expenditures for PAYG 
pensions in Croatia’s GDP is not a problem, but a consequence. Also, individual capitalized retiren-
ment accounts (II. pillar + III. pillar) are not the only fundamental solution, which will be presented 
later in this paper.
The problem, besides unfavorable demographic parameters and relatively high unemploy-
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ment (poor ratio between insurees and retirees) lies in structural imbalance of public (PAYG) 
pension system. Structural problems include unfavorable structure of pension users in relation to 
their age, years of service and type of pension they receive. 
Authors list some of the conclusions (Bađun, 2011.):
•	 Croatia’s retirement system warped with numerous special regulations
•	 The result of it is additional weakening of the relationship between paid contributions 
and pensions
•	 Large number of retirees is somewhat privileged when observing deposited payments, 
considering how long they receive pensions while having insufficient years of service
•	 Intergenerational solidarity connotes reciprocity; when speaking about retirees and 
their rights, it should not be forgotten that young people are future retirees
It should be noted that the average pension time of age pension user in 2010 was 32 years, 
while average pension time for all users was 29. Average pension time slightly increased in the last 
decade, for about a year. There was only 11,7 percent of retirees with pension time of 40 and more 
years in 2010. Both indicators do not encompass Croatian military pension users, Croatian war 
defenders and Croatian Defense Council, meaning the average time that would include all retirees 
is surely lower (Nestić et al., 2011.:20).
Authors emphasize the issue of premature retirement. One third of all new retirees in 2010 
were premature retirees (Rismondo, 2011). Most often, the cause of retirement was „out of neces-
sity“ for those who had that option, mainly encouraged by unfavorable economic conditions in 
Croatia since 2008. Insurees in individual professions (craftsmen, farmers, etc.) – who paid retire-
ment contributions for themselves, pay only one third of required contribution payments, since 
their base (65% of average wage from January-August of the previous year) from which they pay 
contributions is not related with their wages (Zuber, 2011,:274). Zuber notes the reasons are very 
unclear and are probably not only economic, but also indicate a disbelief in the state system and 
are trying to avoid paying all public contributions. Moreover, craftsmen obtain a right to retire-
ment after being insured for 15 years which makes it possible, for example, to own a business for 
35 years, and not pay contributions for 20 years and still get a right to a pension (and are also 
protected by the lowest retirement policy).
Total loss in contributions from PAYG retirement insurance, as Zuber estimates, is 2 billion 
kunas a year (as is indicated in the following graph), due to unpaid retirement contributions from 
generational solidarity calculated based on average wage salary:
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FIGURE 2 - LOSS INCOME FROM RETIREMENT INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS OF GENERA-
TIONAL SOLIDARITY FROM 2003. DO 2008. 
Source: Zuber, Marija, “Possibilities for advancing socioeconomic and fiscal effects of mandatory retirement insurance sys-
tem in Croatia“, doctoral dissertation, University of Rijeka, College of Economics, 2011.
This renting mentality is an expectation that someone else will take care for the individual 
(state?). More precisely, almost one third of retirees get their retirement set without acknowl-
edging the principle of reciprocity between paid contributions and the level of retirement rights 
(Zuber, 2011.:243).
To visually percieve the relative optimisation of pension system’s parameters, financial pa-
rameters of PAYG pension insurance system and healthcare system of Croatia in 2010. will be 
compared. Although systems have different purposes, they are conceptually similar: both take a 
portion of individual’s salary that is later used by HZMO and HZZO.









thou. of kunas 
Additional pro-
ceeds from in 
thou. of kunas
Percentage 






tirement insurance -1. 
tier (HZMO)




15,0% 17 185 633 2 689 056 14,19% 1x
Source: combined data from HZMO, HZZO and country’s budget for 2010 - financial report
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Table 2 clearly shows the extent of potential synthetic level of retirement and healthcare system 
optimisation in Croatia. While nominally identical amounts from wages are outshined for pen-
sion and healthcare insurance (which is questionable by itself, considering the demografic move-
ments, this level of proceeds for retirement contributions cannot meet the payout of current pen-
sions- pension are needed by retirees every month, on the other hand, healthcare services are 
not needed from every citizen every month in a year, based on the law of big numbers), PAYG 
retirement budget has funds six times larger than for the needs of healthcare system. The question 
here is whether funds six times larger for PAYG in relation to budgetary expenditures for public 
healthcare system is a real level of optimized pension system, or is there space for optimisation? 
When hypothetically simplifying a mathematical calculation of costs for pension expendi-
tures, for example, ratio between insurees and retirees =1,23 : 1, contribution charge from salary 
=100% (really under 90%), contribution from brutto salary for 1st pension pillar  of 15% results in 
aproximately 20% amount of net pension (authors’ own calculations based on pondered average 
of income groups in Croatia, according to National agency for statistics – „Employment and wages 
in 2010“), payment of pensions only from PAYG system (1st pillar), we would get the following 
rough financial indicators that need budgetary intervention in the pension system: the amounts of 
collected contributions would cover 24,6 % of net pensions amount in relation to net salaries, on 
which we would have to add additional 15,4% (or 62,6% of total collected contribution amount) 
from budgetary transfers to get a portion of net pension in net salary of about 40%, which is aver-
age rate of exchange for the past few years. However, state adds 20,1 % (or 85% of amount from 
total contributions) to achieve identical rate of exchange, which is 30,51% more. From that 30,51% 
of transfers from the budget, the state finances the difference for disability, defense, family, and 
privileged pensions, the deficit from paid contributions, pension growth rate, transitional expense 
of pension reform and HZMO expenses (HZMO covers its expenditures with paid contributions, 
however, it is still not a key factor and is insufficient for total budgetary billing results for pension 
system). The 30% increase for 2010 translates to 5 billion kunas a year, which is the amount around 
which can be manevred to optimise Croatia’s pension system. 
Furthermore, how do finances look for PAYG pension insurance system in the future? To 
get the idea of projected future movements in relation to financial sustainability of pension sys-
tem, authors emphasize results of a study from Institute for economics (Nestić et al., 2011.), shown 
on the following graphs:  
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FIGURE 3 - PROJECTED EXPENDITURES FOR PENSIONS IN CROATIA, IN % OF GDP 
Source: Challenges and possibilities for achieving proper age pensions in Croatia - a project study – Institute for economics, 
Zagreb, September 2011. 
FIGURE 4 - PROJECTED CONTRIBUTIONS AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR PAYG PART OF 
THE PENSION SYSTEM IN CROATIA 
Source: Challenges and possibilities for achieving proper age pensions in Croatia - a project study – Institute for economics, 
Zagreb, September 2011. 
Methodology of calculating projected fiscal effects of demographical changes is based on 
long-term projections of population movements and set of economical assumptions of future 
movements. According to the projected employment, a gradual increasing rate of activity occurs 
because of three reasons: 1) economic crisis recovery, 2) female average increase in age limit for 
pensions and 3) convergence of activity rates towards rates expected for the new EU member 
countries. Average projected rate of GDP increase from 2010.-2050. is 2,2% per year, while the rate 
of productivity is projected to be 2,5% per year. Having that in mind, the relation between insurees 
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and retirees could increase approximately 1,3:1 untill 2010, as projected. After that it would gradu-
ally decrease to approximately 1,05:1 around year 2050.
The before-mentioned study assumes that if current policies are valid for the whole pe-
riod of indicator’s fiscal sustainability of pension system’s projection, that projected decrease in 
expenses leads to gradual decrease in public pension system’s deficit, which should dissapear by 
2050, that is, all retirement payments from PAYG system would be covered with earnings from 
contributions. This is not a usual trend in the EU, where an increase in expenditures is expected.
In explaining the effect of decreasing pension expenditures, authors note the aging popu-
lation that will push pension expenditures of PAYG system upward. However, effects of other fac-
tors (relative pension level, retirement ratio, dependency ratio, employment effect) will act in op-
posite direction, mainly decreasing pensions, which will ultimately cause a decrease in portion of 
pension expenditures in GDP (up to 50%). The decrease in public expenditures for pensions shoud 
be slightly stronger in 2030-2050 period (parameters for this period are harder to predict) then 
in 2010-2030 period. It is interesting how the turning point in expenditures growth (according to 
graph 4.) is actually year 2010. 
In comparison, results from World bank study (Croatia: Policy Options for Further Pension 
System Reform, 2011.) indicate that PAYG pension insurance system will need few years less for 
the same effect of balance in public pension system. However, since the different calculating meth-
odologies, results from both studies should be taken with reserve. It is a long period of preasure 
on public finances in context of budget deficit and secondary pressure on public debt. Authors 
believe the above mentioned is enough to continue restructuration, reforms and general Croatia’s 
pension system optimisation.
FIGURE 5 - PROJECTED CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES FOR PAYG PENSION INSUR-
ANCE SYSTEM IN CROATIA, IN % OF GDP 
Source: ‘’Croatia: Policy Options for Further Pension System Reform’’, World bank, 2011.
Mentioned projected balance is achieved through replacement rate, that is, with the decrease 
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in part of average net pension in average net salary on levels below 30% (which is currently the 
border level for retiree poverty) which brings a question: Is that a goal for sustainable level of pen-
sions? We could assume that budgetary transfers for current pensions will hardly dissapear (so 
that goals of social politics would not diminish in significance – one of which could be keepeing 
adequate levels of replacement ratio), but relative portion of those transfers in overall expendi-
tures for pension system should decrease over time. To what level? It depends on demographic 
factors, state of economy- already assumed, and future level of pension system’s optimisation.
Future retirement levels
When this research was written, the average pension was around 40% of average net salary 
in Croatia (replacement rate). Later in the text, this indicator will be used in projections for future 
pension levels. We can hardly find out retirees’ real income from the replacement rate. How much 
does the average replacement rate of 40% really reflect on retirees’ real income in period of ten 
years after conducting the last retirement reform in Croatia? 
FIGURE 6 - STRUCTURE OF PENSION USERS ACCORDING TO PENSION AMOUNTS FOR  
SEPTEMBER OF 2011. 
Source: Statistical information from HZMO, no. 3/2011.
In his analysis, Ivica Urban (Urban, 2011) compared retirees’ consumer basket with their 
income and stated that for 28% of retirees, the coverage of consumer basket is under 100% level, 
while for 6% of them, it is below 60% level. Urban (2011) also indicates the poverty rate of retirees 
in Croatia (including income in nature) is 27,9%, according to his analysis. According to National 
agency for statistics, it is 23,7% for the same observed period. From the before-mentioned, we can 
assume the retiree poverty rate is between 25% and 30%, being on 40% of average replacement 
rate. The data were current at the time this paper was written.  At the same time, the state sets 85 
kunas aside from the budget for every 100 kunas of collected pension contributions. Do we have 
enough excuses to criticize the existing pension system? Could these parameters look better if the 
replacement rate was lower? Projections on sustainability of pension system mentioned earlier in 
text actually predicts it, including pensions from second pension tier (individualized capitalised 
accounts). Nevertheless, replacement rate should be viewed conditionally, since future retiree’s 
real income depends mainly on future retiree’s real buying power. 
LONG-TERM OPTIMISATION FUNDAMENTS OF PENSION SYSTEM IN CROATIA 291
THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
“THE CHANGING ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE: ISSUES, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS”
According to World bank study results (Croatia: Policy Options for Further Pension System 
Reform, 2011.), the average gross replacement rate (the average rate of gross pension in gross sal-
ary) could lower by 10% by 2050 for so-called old retirees (only 1st tier), in relation to current state, 
which is from 38% to 27% for men, and from 32% to 21% for women. It is of similar movement for 
so-called old retirees, but on average 5% lower during period of observation. 
 
FIGURE 7 - AVERAGE RATE OF GROSS REPLACEMENT FOR WOMEN (LEFT GRAPH) AND MEN 
(RIGHT GRAPH) 
Source: ‘’Croatia: Policy Options for Further Pension System Reform’’, World bank, 2011.
It is important to mention that previous graph shows gross replacement rate, not net re-
placement rate. Although net replacement rate would probably reach 10 more percentage points, 
it would not, even in best case scenario, reach nowdays net replacement rate of around 40%. 
When estimating starting gross replacement rate (first pension after last salary), the projection is 
somewhat more favourable then average gross replacement rate viewed in percentage difference 
between so-called old and new retirees. However, the decreasing trend during the observation 
period is also present, as the next graph shows. 
FIGURE 8 - BEGINNING GROSS REPLACEMENT RATE FOR WOMEN (LEFT GRAPH) AND MEN 
(RIGHT GRAPH) 
Source: ‘’Croatia: Policy Options for Further Pension System Reform’’, World bank, 2011.
Projected trend of replacement rate decrease during observed period is also effect of so-called 
Swiss pension calculation (audit) formula (based on ratio of 50% salary growth valorisation and 
50% indexation towards price level movements. A model used in projection production is so-
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called PROST model (standard World Bank model used in pension system parameter analysis in 
more than 90 countries in the world). Macroeconomic indicators used in previous projections are 
as follows: 
TABLE 3 - MACROECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS IN WORLD BANK’S STUDY OF PENSION  
PROJECTIONS (AVERAGE ACCORDING TO PERIOD) 
2011.-2012. 2013.-2020. 2021.-2035. 2036.-2070.
Average employment growth 
(year per year)
1,1 1,5 -0,2 -0,7
Real salary growth rate 1,1 2,7 2,2 2,2
Inflation rate 2,8 3,0 2,9 2,5
Real GDP growth 2,3 3,9 2,1 1,5
Source: ‘’Croatia: Policy Options for Further Pension System Reform’’, World bank, 2011., pg. 19
Relatively similar pension system movements projections were found in before-mentioned 
study by the Institute for economics, which used the following assumptions (Nestić et al., 2011.): 
•	 Laws did not change in the projections period
•	 Average yearly growth of real salaries is 2,6%, the same as yearly growth rate of real 
salaries for EU-12 (new EU members)
•	 Yearly inflation rate is 2%
•	 Yearly real netto yield from pension funds is 2,5%  (in accumulation phase), and 1,7% 
in payment phase (yield decreased for all restitutions) 
•	 Brutto and netto replacement rate is defined as beggining, and not average replace-
ment rate (i.e. as first pension in relation to the last salary)
The study indicates the possibility for Croatia to have the lowest starting replacement rate 
by 2050, in relation to current EU member countries, which is roughly 38% (mix system: 1.+2. pil-
lar) as opposed to 55% (only 1. pillar) in 2010. That would theoretically mean a set-back from 2010, 
when only Estonia, Romania, and Cyprus had lower replacement rates. Further projection analysis 
forecasted a decrease in average starting net replacement rates up to 36% by 2030. Afterwords, 
they would stay pretty stable and amount for 36-37% od net salary, which is explained by reach-
ing the maturity level of individualized capital savings (2nd pillar). However, a slight decrease of 
replacement rate is projected after 2042, a consequence of „Swiss formula“ effect.
The so-called „Swiss formula“ has a negative connotation. In addition, most OECD coun-
tries accepted 100% salary valorisation and 100% price indexation, in the context of pension funds, 
for multiple reasons (as is written in before-mentioned study by the World bank): a) such calcula-
tion keeps retirees’ buying power as time passes, b) brigs fiscal and social benefits in the long-run, 
c) strenghtens the link between contributions and later benefits from contributions. The qustion 
is why would the „Swiss formula“ stay the the same in the Croatian example? The reason for it may 
be found in short-term and mid-term increasing pressure on budgetary expenses. 
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FIGURE 9 - AVERAGE RATE OF NET REPLACEMENT FOR „AVERAGE“ WORKER (2012.-2052.)
Source: Challenges and possibilities for achieving adequate age pensions in Croatia - project study – Institute for economics, 
Zagreb, September 2011.
N.B.: ‘average’ worker is defined as a person that goes to age pension after 65 years of age and 40 years of work experience, assuming 
he/she received average wage for all his/her life.
Unlike World bank’s study that indicated average growth rates of real salaries between 
2 and 2,5% without spillover effect on pensions’ buying power, a study by Institute for econom-
ics quantifies future pensions’ buying power, taking the assumption of 2,5% real salaries growth. 
Whilst, the study indicates, pensions’ buying power could increase 20% by 2027, and 50% by 2050. 
These indicators sound optimistic when observing pensions buying power separately. If we dis-
count such optimistic assumptions to current net replacement rates, it would mean an equivalent 
level higher then 55% of net replacement rate. However, it is hard to expect similar life circum-
stances and material trends for such a long projection period. Not to mention, currently the safest 
assumption is for demografic indicators, in relation between insurees and retirees up to 2050, 
will not reach the level of two employees on one retiree (Luburić, 2010.:46). Intuitively speaking, 
very little can be expected from from positive demographic movements. On the other hand, the 
average worker’s material life expenses are increasing. It is possible that level of material survival is 
easier to reach nowadays. However, if projections were to be right, it would automatically mean 
that mid-class employees could have higher buying power. Would they fit in today’s mid-class? 
The assumption is that current low, mid, and high income groups will be rated differently in 2050. 
Therefore, the before-mentioned percentage gap in replacement rate could possibly be negatively 
related to pension levels. 
Morevoer, according to projections by the Institute for economics, a slow decrease is ex-
pected (first pension’s net replacement rate in relation to salaries and like ten years after the retire-
ment), precisely:  
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 TABLE 4 - NET REPLACEMENT RATE FOR A TYPICAL WORKER IN RETIREMENT PHASE AND 
TEN YEARS AFTER THE RETIREMENT 
Replacement rate in 2012. which 
is the starting year of retirement 
Replacement rate 10 years after 
retireeing - 2022.
Average worker (40 years of service), 
PAYG system
53% 46%
Replacement rate in 2040. which is 
the starting year of retirement
Replacement rate 10 years after 
retireeing - 2050.
Typical worker (40 years of service), 
mixed system
36% 30%
Replacement rate in 2012. which is the starting 
year of retirement
Average worker (33,5 years of service, average salary), 
PAYG system
44,15%
Replacement rate in 2052. which is the starting year of 
retirement
Average worker (35 years of service, average salary), 
mixed system
31,5%
Source: Challenges and possibilities for reaching proper age pensions in Croatia - project study - Izazovi i mogućnosti za 
ostvarenje primjerenih starosnih mirovina u Hrvatskoj - projektna studija – Insitute for economics, Zagreb, September 2011.
N.B.: ‘typical’ worker is defined as a person that goes to scheduled age retirement (65 years of age and 40 years of service), assuming the 
worker received average salary in the country. 
A relative decrease in starting replacement rate and current replacement rate ten years 
after retirement (for pensions in mixed system in relation to those from current PAYG system) is 
noted. The reason lies in pensions’ growth rate which is more for pensions from PAYG system then 
in mixed system. Capitalised part of pension system indexes pensions only according to inflation, 
unlike PAYG pensions which are adjusted 50:50, for wage growth and inflation, respectively. 
The border line of poverty will have the main role in correlating adequate pensions, con-
sidering the longievity of projections.  35% of average salary is currently a poverty line. Taking the 
projections into account, in 2052., one would have to earn approximately 75% of average wage 
over 40 years of service in order to keep his/her retirement level above the poverty line (Nestić et 
al., 2011.:47).
PAYG portion of the mixed pension is going to decrease with future retirees, in relation to 
pensions from 2nd pillar. The assumption is that those insurees who spent their entire work life 
with dual pension system will realize bacis pension from 1st pillar (Nestić et al.,2006.:54).   
In the end, the Association of Pension Funds in Croatia (UMFO, 2011.) believs the pension 
system to be as sustainable as it was in year 2000, since nor the replacement rate nor budgetary 
transfers have changed for the better in the past ten years. 
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III. CONCLUSION – BASES FOR RESTRUCTURING AND OPTIMISATION OF EXIST-
ING PENSION SYSTEM IN CROATIA
Review of retirement rights in view of expenditure decrease and juctice increase in pension in-
come redistribution solves one important part of the problem – sustainability of pension system 
through the prism of public finances. However, the before-mentioned pension system’s optimisa-
tion means adequate pension levels in the future. And in that context, it will be hard to avoid the 
question about restructuring pension contributions, but also a broader picture on select from 
insurees’ salaries. The remainder of this paper concentrates on adequately finding solutions that 
could optimize pension levels for new retirees in the long-run. 
The following are suggestions on how to improve the sustainability of pension system, 
categorized by frequency and importance: 
•	 Measures for a potential increase (or no decrease) in future pension levels – measures 
that mainly touch on assigning money for 1st/2nd pension pillar
•	 Propositions on strenghtening the relation between paind contributions and received 
pensions (also the institutionalization of so-called zero rate – tax or budgetary pillar) 
•	 Propositions suggesting the increase of balance between solidarity (redistribution) 
and personal care for retirement savings (a notion of individual responsability for re-
ceiving income at old age or encouraging personal savings for old age) 
•	 Questions on socially acceptable and fiscally sustainable system of pension valorisa-
tion and indexation (i.e. „the Swiss formula – pros and cons) 
•	 Suggestions indicating reconsidering pension rights and solving injustice in existing 
pension system 
When writting about the fundamental changes in the pension system or its restructuring, 
then an important factor is longevity, as with simple or complex interest account of simple or 
some sort of exponential function. Small changes can nowadays have multiplicative positive and 
negative effect in the future. If the pension system is perceived like this, it is partially undestand-
able that the sinteticity of future projections (i.e. relative inertion in the context of fundamental 
changes – for simple reasons – they are intouchable, mostlc conceptual). All of it for long-term 
factor.  
On the other hand, if conceptual changes in pension system are viewed exclusively in the 
long-run, then two most important agregate indicators surface which are indicators of pension 
system’s level of optimisation: its sustainability and pension level.  If nothing changes, sustainabil-
ity of pension system should better in the long-run, as explained earlier. As this are, it should be 
on future pension level’s burden. Therefore, if pension system’s optimisation is the goal, then the 
main fundamental step towards improving  is optimising future pensions that would be fiscaly and 
socially acceptable. The continuation of pension reform should be beamed towards exactly that 
goal, acknowledging fiscal sustainability of the whole system, as previously set.   
The main instruments for increasing future pension levels, while acknowledging all before-
mentioned measures, are proceeds for pension contributions (1.+ 2. pillar). Without the increase 
in proceeds for pension contributions (thinking mainly on 2nd pillar), it is simple to mathemati-
2nd pillar pension
total accumulated netto amount decreased
  
   
=
     
  
for all provisions after yield
estimated life expectany
( )
   after work life
(1)
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cally prove an inability of future pension levels to increase. The following is a simplified calculation: 
 If the average age at the time of retirement is statistically estimated fixed number, then the only 
way the total pension can be higher is to increase accumulated amount of paid contributions for 
2nd pillar, except for the following two cases: increase in fiscal expenditures (change in the way 
pensions are calculated) or long-term increase in number of workers in relation to retirees (again 
the change in the way pensions are calculated).  The first scenario is not the aim of pension re-
form, and the other case is hypothetical. But what we can calculate is finding the „golden middle“ 
between increasing pension contributions or pressures to decrease net worker salaries or even 
raising the bar for two (costs) gross salaries. 
Based on explanations, the authors suggest their own methodology for defining the model 
of change in the pension system: 
1. An increase in proceeds for pension contributions with a goal to restructure 1st and 
2nd pension pillars (one of fundamental changes to expected long-term positive ef-
fect on financial stability of pension system). 
2. Do not create pressure when increasing gross two (cost of salary). 
3. Minimalizing the potential pressure to decrease net salary.
4. Correction of other proceeds from gross salary – to open up a space for restructuring 
pension pilars.
5. Income taxes reform – to completely neutralize any increase in money mass between 
net salary and costs (gross two) salaries – yet, such ratio needs to be decreased – why? 
Work needs to be stimulated, not taxed! In that way, tax evasion would loose its im-
portance in the long run. 
6. Parallel increase of 1st and 2nd pillar – so-called sliding stair model of pension sys-
tem- Why increase of both pillars? Increasing the rate of contributions for 1st pillar, 
we actually neutralize an increase in 2nd pillar without the need to increase pension 
expenditures by the state. That positive effect is tranfused into other public finance 
system’s deficits (other contributions from salaries) – so-called proceeds conversion 
from gross salary. Also, increasing contribution rate for 1st pillar buys more space for 
increasing proceeds, in the long-term, once the PAYG pension expenditures show de-
creasing tendency. That is, when we gradually start going back to 15% level of PAYG’s 
proceeds rate, or simply exchange the same percentage with the same percentage of 
proceeds increase for the 2nd pillar.
7. Gradual conversion of the whole system towards NDC (notion defined contribution) 
models of pension systems (for example, Sweden) 
Implications of set bases in the model come from accounting changes in calculating the 
salary; therefore, an inductive method is used to translate it to all other systems comprised by 
the salary calculation. Authors emphasize that any changes in the pension system and salary cal-
culations would be insufficient, that is, if other system changes from public finances area are not 
included, which would destroy defined bases, and therefore motivational factors for changes.
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